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Instytucje: między mechanizmem rynkowym i mechanizmami władzy

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  • Anna Ząbkowicz

Abstract

Artykuł przedstawia próbę instytucjonalnego podejścia do gospodarki. Korzystając z asocjacji z naukami o zarządzaniu, autorka proponuje, aby z pomocą podstawowych koncepcji nowej ekonomii instytucjonalnej dokonać rekonstrukcji spójnego i kompleksowego obrazu gospodarki. Jedno z kluczowych pojęć w tej dziedzinie, mianowicie governance, wykorzystuje jako narzędzie tworzenia tego obrazu. W tym ujęciu governance oznacza rozwiązywanie konfliktów w ramach gospodarującej organizacji, a government odnosi się do koordynacji interesów gospodarczych w strukturach państwa. Przedstawiona próba schematycznego ujęcia porządku gospodarczego zwraca uwagę również na rolę władzy, chociaż aspekt ten nie jest szerzej rozważany. Koncepcja porządku gospodarczego pomaga usystematyzować myślenie o gospodarce i zwraca uwagę na nierynkowe instytucje, które mogą wspomagać lub osłabiać konkurencję rynkową. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Ząbkowicz, 2019. "Instytucje: między mechanizmem rynkowym i mechanizmami władzy," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 2, pages 145-162.
  • Handle: RePEc:aoq:ekonom:y:2019:i:2:p:145-162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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