IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aiy/jnljtr/v2y2016i3p193-207.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Theoretical framework for building optimal transport taxation system

Author

Listed:
  • Yulia V. Leontyeva
  • Igor A. Mayburov

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the theoretical and methodological basis of building an optimal transport taxation system. That includes establishing classification criteria, functions and principles of building the system. The article systematizes economic views on the nature of transport taxes and outlines the genesis of transport taxation. The article substantiates that the genesis of studies on transport taxation involved the development of economic measures of the size of compensation which followed the special-to-general model, that is, from compensation for the use of particular road network facilities to compensation for the entirety of negative externalities and the use of the whole road network. The article systemizes functions of transport taxation and analyses its two main functions: fiscal and regulatory ones. The article rationalizes that the regulatory function in transport taxation is equally significant. The article analyzes negative external effects resulting from accelerated growth in car ownership. In addition, it substantiates that pure public benefits relating to motor vehicle use tend to transform into mixed benefits in the course of mass car ownership, which, in turn, remain non-excludable, but become rivalrous in consumption. The work presents an original classification of transport taxes based on the main classification criteria. Transport taxes are classified based on types and designation of transport payments, stages of the life cycle of a motor vehicle, the way the tax is levied, the influence it has on the intensity of car use and the purpose of revenue spending. The work offers a system of principles of optimal transport taxation consisting of well-known and new ones. The article further develops the benefit principle in transport taxation as well as the social optimum principle. In addition, it provides definitions for original principles identified by the author: the principle of comprehensiveness, the principle of differentiation, the principle of payment collection at time of service, and the principle of designation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yulia V. Leontyeva & Igor A. Mayburov, 2016. "Theoretical framework for building optimal transport taxation system," Journal of Tax Reform, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 2(3), pages 193-207.
    • Handle: RePEc:aiy:jnljtr:v:2:y:2016:i:3:p:193-207
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2016.2.3.024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://jtr.urfu.ru/fileadmin/user_upload/site_15907/Leontyeva_Mayburov_ispr.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2016.2.3.024?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David M. Newbery & Georgina Santos, 1999. "Road taxes, road user charges and earmarking," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(2), pages 103-132, June.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. De Borger, Bruno & Mayeres, Inge, 2007. "Optimal taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport: Insights derived from a discrete choice numerical optimization model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1177-1204, July.
    4. Robin Lindsey, 2006. "Do Economists Reach A Conclusion on Road Pricing? The Intellectual History of an Idea," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 3(2), pages 292-379, May.
    5. Pierre-Henri DERYCKE, 1998. "Road pricing-Analysis and policies (A historical perspective)," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1998014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    6. Delucchi, Mark, 2007. "Do Motor-Vehicle Users in the US Pay Their Way?," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt5841z3kx, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.
    7. Delucchi, Mark A., 2007. "Do motor-vehicle users in the US pay their way?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 41(10), pages 982-1003, December.
    8. Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-322, June.
    9. Borger, Bruno De, 2011. "Optimal congestion taxes in a time allocation model," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 79-95, January.
    10. Delucchi, Mark, 2007. "Do Motor-Vehicle Users in the US Pay Their Way?," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt2884w7km, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.
    11. Verhoef, Erik, 1994. "External effects and social costs of road transport," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 273-287, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gonzales, Eric Justin, 2011. "Allocation of Space and the Costs of Multimodal Transport in Cities," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt7s28n4nj, University of California Transportation Center.
    2. Tscharaktschiew, Stefan & Hirte, Georg, 2012. "Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 285-309.
    3. Mark Delucchi & Don McCubbin, 2011. "External Costs of Transport in the United States," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Dumortier, Jerome & Zhang, Fengxiu & Marron, John, 2017. "State and federal fuel taxes: The road ahead for U.S. infrastructure funding," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 39-49.
    5. McIntosh, C.R. & Wilmot, N.A. & Skalberg, R.K., 2015. "Paying for harbor maintenance in the US: Options for moving past the Harbor Maintenance Tax," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 210-221.
    6. Scheiner, Joachim, 2018. "Transport costs seen through the lens of residential self-selection and mobility biographies," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 126-136.
    7. Gonzales, Eric Justin, 2011. "Allocation of Space and the Costs of Multimodal Transport in Cities," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt07x7h9pg, University of California Transportation Center.
    8. Vanoutrive, Thomas & Zijlstra, Toon, 2018. "Who has the right to travel during peak hours? On congestion pricing and ‘desirable’ travellers," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 98-107.
    9. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    10. Jonathan Colmer & Ralf Martin & Mirabelle Muûls & Ulrich J. Wagner, 2020. "Does pricing carbon mitigate climate change? Firm-level evidence from the European Union emissions trading scheme," CEP Discussion Papers dp1728, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    11. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 109-130, October.
    12. Varian, Hal R., 1995. "Coase, competition, and compensation," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 13-27, May.
    13. Dieter Schmidtchen & Jenny Helstroffer & Christian Koboldt, 2021. "Regulatory failure and the polluter pays principle: why regulatory impact assessment dominates the polluter pays principle," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 23(1), pages 109-144, January.
    14. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & de Vries, Frans P., 2006. "Location choice by households and polluting firms: An evolutionary approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 425-446, February.
    15. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    16. John P. Conley & Stefani C. Smith, 2004. "Existence and Efficiency of a Price-Taking Equilibrium in an Economy with Public Goods, Externalities and Property Rights: A Coasian Approach," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0403, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Jan 2004.
    17. Vorotnikova, Ekaterina & Schmitz, Andrew, 2013. "On Positive Externality," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150462, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    18. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt & Jenny Monheim & Birgit Will & Georg Haas, "undated". "The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the Polluter Pays to the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2008-1-1214, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    19. Gaël Giraud & Cécile Renouard, 2011. "In search of an alternative to shareholder value maximization," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11038, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    20. Acey, Charisma & Kisiangani, Joyce & Ronoh, Patrick & Delaire, Caroline & Makena, Evelyn & Norman, Guy & Levine, David & Khush, Ranjiv & Peletz, Rachel, 2019. "Cross-subsidies for improved sanitation in low income settlements: Assessing the willingness to pay of water utility customers in Kenyan cities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 160-177.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aiy:jnljtr:v:2:y:2016:i:3:p:193-207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Natalia Starodubets (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/seurfru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.