Corporate Governance And Firm Performance
Good corporate governance is an important step in building market confidence and encouraging more stable, long-term international investment flows. Many countries see better corporate governance practices as a way to improve economic dynamism and thus enhance overall economic performance. This paper sets out to further develop our understanding of corporate governance and its effects on corporate performance and economic performance. In doing so, it addresses some of the underlying factors that promote efficient corporate governance, and examines some of the economic implications associated with various corporate governance systems. I provide an framework for understanding how corporate governance can affect corporate performance. In the wake of a literature survey, I find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, insider ownership matters the most, outside ownership concentration destroys market value, direct ownership being superior to indirect.
Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
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- R. Glenn Hubbard, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glen90-1, December.
- McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
- Claessens, Constantijn A. & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 1999. "Who controls East Asian corporations ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2054, The World Bank.
- Garvey, Gerald T. & Swan, Peter L., 1994. "The economics of corporate governance: Beyond the Marshallian firm," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 139-174, August.
- Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
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