Public Policy On Cattle Tick Control In New South Wales
An economic problem exists in the allocation of resources to cattle tick control. The decisions of private individuals on tick control are unlikely to result in a desirable allocatin from society's viewpoint because of market failure. Such market failure will be due to significant externalities, risk and economies of scale in cattle tick control and ignorance of tick control by producers. Government involvement is justified to achieve a better allocation of resources than would otherwise occur. Choice of the desirable level of Government involvement and of the best control strategy will depend upon reduction of the decision problem to a choice between a combination of a small number of strategies and policy instruments and empirical evaluation of the benefits and costs of these. The difficulties of doing so are discussed. The distribution of benefits is analyzed. Arguments are presented for adopting the principle that the beneficiaries of tick control should pay. Based on this principle methods of raising finance for cattle tick control in New South Wales are analyzed and recommendations made. The results are presented of a cost-benefit study on cattle tick control. It was assumed that the current level of Government involvement would continue and the study sought to determine whether eradication was a more economic policy than the present control policy. Eradication was shown to be most probably superior to continued control. The use is demonstrated of subjective probabilities determined by groups.
Volume (Year): 43 (1975)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: AARES Central Office Manager, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, Canberra ACT 0200|
Phone: 0409 032 338
Web page: http://www.aares.info/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Oakland, William H, 1974. "Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 927-939, Sept./Oct.
- Duncan, R & Tisdell, Clem, 1971. "Research and Technical Progress: The Returns to Producers," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 47(117), pages 124-29, March.
- Meade J. E., 1973. "Mishan (E.J.) - Cost Benefit Analysis," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 24(5), pages 887-889.
- Cassidy, P.A. & Rodgers, J.L. & McCarthy, W.O., 1970. "A Simulation Approach to Risk Assessment in Investment Analysis," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 38(01), March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:remaae:9194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.