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Driving forces in the expansion of enclosure among pastoral and agropastoral herders in Ethiopia

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  • Beyene, Fekadu

Abstract

The paper analyses factors influencing rangeland enclosure practices among groups of herders in eastern Ethiopia. The study employed logistic and linear regressions to identify the determinants. Linear regression results show that the labor endowment of a household has a positive influence on households’ decision to enclose. Greater network density and membership in different social organizations produce disincentives. Livestock ownership and membership as a resident in a village have a positive effect on the area fenced. The logit model shows that wealth and ownership of private water points positively determine range enclosure. However, there is no positive linear relationship between labor endowment and area fenced. In addition, land allocated to crop farming has a negative influence, rejecting the hypothesis that herders’ intention is primarily to cultivate the enclosed land.

Suggested Citation

  • Beyene, Fekadu, 2010. "Driving forces in the expansion of enclosure among pastoral and agropastoral herders in Ethiopia," Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, Humboldt-Universitaat zu Berlin, vol. 49(2), pages 1-20.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:qjiage:155545
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.155545
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Haftay Hailu Gebremedhn & Tessema Zewdu Kelkay & Yayanshet Tesfay & Samuel Tuffa & Sintayehu Workeneh Dejene & Sylvanus Mensah & Adam John Mears Devenish & Anthony Egeru, 2022. "Carbon Stock and Change Rate under Different Grazing Management Practices in Semiarid Pastoral Ecosystem of Eastern Ethiopia," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-13, April.

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