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Special and Differential Treatment in the GATT: A Pyrrhic Victory for Developing Countries

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  • Christie, Andrew

Abstract

Preferential measures for developing countries implemented within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade failed to achieve their purported goal of facilitating economic development; this failure was due to their weak theoretical underpinnings and poor policy design. Not only were the demands developing countries made for discriminatory preferences largely ineffectual, their demands for preferential treatment, together with their forgoing full participation in the multilateral trading system, fundamentally reduced the obligation of developed countries to consider the interests of developing countries in future negotiation rounds. Thus the winning of preferences was rendered a pyrrhic victory for developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Christie, Andrew, 2009. "Special and Differential Treatment in the GATT: A Pyrrhic Victory for Developing Countries," Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade, vol. 10(2), pages 1-22.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ecjilt:55900
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.55900
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Luiza Cortez & Mehmet Arda, 2014. "Global trade rules for supporting development in the post-2015 era," CDP Background Papers 019, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    2. Omphemetse S. Sibanda Sr., 2015. "Towards a Revised GATT/WTO Special and Differential Treatment Regime for Least Developed and Developing Countries," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 50(1), pages 31-40, February.

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