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Efficiency of alternative property right allocations when farmers produce multiple environmental goods under the condition of economies of scope


  • Strappazzon, Loris
  • Ha, Arthur
  • Eigenraam, Mark
  • Duke, Charlotte
  • Stoneham, Gary


The efficiency implications of different property right allocations when two environmental goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scope are analysed. It is assumed that an environmental agency – acting on behalf of the community – employs an auction‐based mechanism to buy biodiversity services from farmers. However, farmers’ production of biodiversity produces a second good as a by‐product (e.g., mitigation of a river pollutant) that is valued by point‐source emitters who are engaged in a pollution trading market. The efficiency implications of allocating the property right of the good, mitigation, to either the agency or farmers are analysed. If the agency owns the mitigation then the agency can sell mitigation to point‐source emitters, offsetting the cost of biodiversity. If farmers own mitigation, then they sell it directly to point‐source emitters. Assuming similar transaction costs associated with each property‐right allocation, allocating the property right to farmers improves efficiency, as farmers take account of their private information to make profit‐maximising decisions about the supply of biodiversity and mitigation; the agency would have trouble accessing this private information.

Suggested Citation

  • Strappazzon, Loris & Ha, Arthur & Eigenraam, Mark & Duke, Charlotte & Stoneham, Gary, 2003. "Efficiency of alternative property right allocations when farmers produce multiple environmental goods under the condition of economies of scope," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(1), March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aareaj:116171

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Richard McKelvey & Talbot Page, 2000. "An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(3), pages 187-213, December.
    2. Zvika Neeman, 1999. "Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 679-691.
    3. Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eigenraam, Mark & Strappazzon, Loris & Lansdell, Nicola & Beverly, Craig & Stoneham, Gary, 2006. "Designing Frameworks to Deliver Unknown Information to Support MBIs," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25673, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Mark Eigenraam & Loris Strappazzon & Nicola Lansdell & Craig Beverly & Gary Stoneham, 2007. "Designing frameworks to deliver unknown information to support market-based instruments," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(s1), pages 261-269, December.

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    Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;


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