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Are Differentiated Carbon Taxes Inefficient? A General Equilibrium Analysis

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  • Brita Bye
  • Karine Nyborg

Abstract

Revenue-raising environmental policy instruments, such as carbon taxes, tend to be politically controversial. In practice, carbon taxes are often differentiated between polluters, implying unequal marginal abatement costs. Grandfathered tradeable permits seem less controversial; this instrument yields equal marginal abatement costs, but does not raise revenue. We compare a system of differentiated carbon taxes, exemplified by the current Norwegian carbon tax regime, to uniform carbon taxation and grandfathered tradeable emission permits. In this particular case, differentiated taxes are welfare superior to grandfathered permits. Nevertheless, uniform carbon taxes outperform both.

Suggested Citation

  • Brita Bye & Karine Nyborg, 2003. "Are Differentiated Carbon Taxes Inefficient? A General Equilibrium Analysis," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 95-112.
  • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:2003v24-02-a04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Geir H. Bjertnæs & Taran Fæhn, 2004. "Energy Taxation in a Small, Open Economy: Efficiency Gains under Political Restraints," Discussion Papers 387, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    2. Geir H. Bjertnæs & Taran Fæhn & Jørgen Aasness, 2008. "Designing an electricity tax system in presence of international regulations and multiple public goals: An empirical assessment," Discussion Papers 555, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    3. Olga Kiuila & Anil Markandya, 2009. "Can transition economies implement a carbon tax and hope for a double dividend? The case of Estonia," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(7), pages 705-709.
    4. Geir H. Bjertnæs, 2005. "Avoiding Adverse Employment Effects from Energy Taxation: What does it cost?," Discussion Papers 432, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    5. Lloyd, Bob, 2007. "The Commons revisited: The tragedy continues," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5806-5818, November.
    6. Alberto Gago & Xavier Labandeira & Xiral López Otero, 2014. "A Panorama on Energy Taxes and Green Tax Reforms," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 208(1), pages 145-190, March.
    7. Carlos Chávez & John Stranlund, 2009. "A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 137-144.
    8. Bjertnæs, Geir H. & Fæhn, Taran & Aasness, Jørgen, 2008. "Designing an electricity tax system in presence of international regulations and multiple public goals: An empirical assessment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 3723-3733, October.
    9. Udo Ebert, 2007. "Redistributional Preference in Environmental Policy," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 63(4), pages 548-562, December.
    10. Bjertnæs, Geir H. & Fæhn, Taran, 2008. "Energy taxation in a small, open economy: Social efficiency gains versus industrial concerns," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 2050-2071, July.
    11. Bjertnæs, Geir H., 2011. "Avoiding adverse employment effects from electricity taxation in Norway: What does it cost?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 4766-4773, September.
    12. Asafu-Adjaye, John & Mahadevan, Renuka, 2013. "Implications of CO2 reduction policies for a high carbon emitting economy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 32-41.

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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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