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Petroleum Price Elasticity, Income Effects, and OPEC's Pricing Policy

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  • F. Gerard Adams
  • Jaime Marquez

Abstract

A standard result from static economic theory is that a monopolist with zero cost will maximize profits by charging the price at which the demand has unit elasticity. Yet, the demand for petroleum, as seen by consumers, is price inelastic, and empirical estimates of the price elasticity for petroleum are typically less than one. Given the relatively low production cost for Middle East oil and the optimization rule referred to above, a natural question is whether OPEC, acting as a monopoly, has exhausted its potential for forcing price increases or whether it will ultimately be able to charge still higher prices as it tries to optimize its earnings. This possibility of higher oil prices is important for OPEC and for oil-consuming countries-for OPEC because the finite nature of resources implies that excess production today represents an irrecoverable loss; for consuming countries because of the high cost of oil and the adverse consequences of still higher oil prices on inflation and unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Gerard Adams & Jaime Marquez, 1984. "Petroleum Price Elasticity, Income Effects, and OPEC's Pricing Policy," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 115-128.
  • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:1984v05-01-a07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yousefi, Ayoub & Wirjanto, Tony S., 2004. "The empirical role of the exchange rate on the crude-oil price formation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 783-799, September.
    2. Naoyuki Yoshino & Victoriia Alekhina, 2019. "Empirical Analysis of Global Oil Price Determinants at the Disaggregated Level Over the Last Two Decades," ADBI Working Papers 982, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    3. Ayoub Yousefi & Tony S. Wirjanto, 2005. "A stylized exchange rate pass‐through model of crude oil price formation," OPEC Energy Review, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, vol. 29(3), pages 177-197, September.

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