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The "New Political Economy": Recent Books by Allen Drazen and by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini

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  • Gilles Saint-Paul

Abstract

The last fifteen years have seen an explosion of contributions in the field of political economy. Two new books, Political Economy in Macroeconomics by Allan Drazen and Political Economy: Explaining Economic Policy by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, organize this literature and evaluate what has been learned. Drazen mostly focuses on applications for macroeconomic policy, while Persson and Tabellini focus on the various tools that can be used to analyze the political process, and the institutional details of decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Saint-Paul, 2000. "The "New Political Economy": Recent Books by Allen Drazen and by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(4), pages 915-925, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:38:y:2000:i:4:p:915-925
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.38.4.915
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2005. "Uncertainty and resistance to reform in laboratory participation games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 708-737, September.
    2. Filoso, Valerio, 2008. "Sulla domanda di economia irrazionale: Naomi Klein vs. Milton Friedman [On the Demand of Irrational Economics: Naomi Klein vs. Milton Friedman]," MPRA Paper 9452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2003. "Testing Political Economy Models of Reform in the Laboratory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 208-212, May.
    4. Ana Fernandes, 2008. "Endogenous Political Economy: On the Inevitability of Inefficiency under the Natural Resource Curse," Diskussionsschriften dp0802, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    5. Josten, Stefan Dietrich & Truger, Achim, 2003. "The political economy of growth and distribution: A theoretical critique," WSI Working Papers 111, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    6. Timothy P. Roth, 2014. "Economists and the State," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15078.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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