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Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings

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Listed:
  • James Schummer
  • Rodrigo A. Velez

Abstract

Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others' preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones.

Suggested Citation

  • James Schummer & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2021. "Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 116-147, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:116-47
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180065
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Alexander L. Brown & Daniel G. Stephenson & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2024. "Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms," Papers 2404.11883, arXiv.org.
    3. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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