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The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves

Author

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  • Anil K. Kashyap
  • Jeremy C. Stein

Abstract

In a world with interest on reserves, the central bank has two distinct tools that it can use to raise the short-term policy rate: it can either increase the interest it pays on reserve balances, or it can reduce the quantity of reserves in the system. We argue that by using both of these tools together, and by broadening the scope of reserve requirements, the central bank can simultaneously pursue two objectives: it can manage the inflation-output tradeoff using a Taylor-type rule, and it can regulate the externalities created by socially excessive shortterm debt issuance on the part of financial intermediaries. (JEL E43, E52, E58, G21)

Suggested Citation

  • Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 266-282, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:4:y:2012:i:1:p:266-82
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.1.266
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2011. "The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetarypolicy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 54-79, January.
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    3. Todd Keister & Antoine Martin & James J. McAndrews, 2008. "Divorcing money from monetary policy," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 14(Sep), pages 41-56.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 2010. "Unstable banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 306-318, September.
    5. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
    6. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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