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Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service

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  • Martin Mattsson

Abstract

Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Mattsson, 2025. "Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 414-445, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:414-45
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20230672
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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