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Credit Rationing?

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  • Dan Bernhardt

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Suggested Citation

  • Dan Bernhardt, 2000. "Credit Rationing?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 235-239, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:235-239
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.1.235
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.90.1.235
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Parker & Mirjam van Praag, 2004. "Schooling, Capital Constraints and Entrepreneurial Performance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-106/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Mar 2005.
    2. Goldbach, Stefan, 2012. "Innovation and Education: Is there a 'Nerd Effect'?," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62307, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Cesaroni, Giovanni & Messori, Marcello, 2006. "Financial constraints and unemployment equilibrium," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 131-147, September.
    4. Hanson, Samuel G. & Sunderam, Adi, 2013. "Are there too many safe securities? Securitization and the incentives for information production," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 565-584.
    5. Hans K. Hvide & Jarle Møen, 2010. "Lean and Hungry or Fat and Content? Entrepreneurs' Wealth and Start-Up Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(8), pages 1242-1258, August.
    6. Sewaid, Ahmed & Parker, Simon C. & Kaakeh, Abdulkader, 2021. "Explaining serial crowdfunders' dynamic fundraising performance," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 36(4).
    7. Hvide, Hans K. & Møen, Jarle, 2007. "Liquidity Constraints and Entrepreneurial Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 6495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Arndt Werner, 2007. "Entrepreneurial Signaling via Education: A Success Factor in Innovative Start-Ups," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 173-190, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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