IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/deveco/v52y2014i2p179-201.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Comparison between Formal and Informal Mutual-credit Arrangements

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Reito
  • Salvatore Spagano

Abstract

type="main"> We analyze under what conditions a group of potential entrepreneurs prefer to form a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), or a mutual-guarantee association, which we interpret in a rotating scheme and call Rotating Savings and Collateral Association (ROSCoA). We argue that: (1) ROSCAs (ROSCoAs) are likely to be more developed in countries with high (low) bank concentration; (2) the individual flow of savings required to participate in a ROSCoA is generally lower than that needed in a ROSCA; (3) under the assumption that members share their project income at the end of each period, ROSCAs and ROsCoAs are sustainable even without the use of sanctioning mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Reito & Salvatore Spagano, 2014. "A Comparison between Formal and Informal Mutual-credit Arrangements," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 52(2), pages 179-201, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:deveco:v:52:y:2014:i:2:p:179-201
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/deve.12043
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn, 1993. "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 792-810, September.
    2. Mary Kay Gugerty, 2007. "You Can't Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55, pages 251-282.
    3. Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica, 2009. "Credit Market Failures and Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 363-382, June.
    4. Madajewicz, Malgosia, 2011. "Joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 107-123, February.
    5. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
    6. Marcel Fafchamps & Eliana La Ferrara, 2012. "Self-Help Groups and Mutual Assistance: Evidence from Urban Kenya," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(4), pages 707-733.
    7. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
    8. Thorp, Rosemary & Stewart, Frances & Heyer, Amrik, 2005. "When and how far is group formation a route out of chronic poverty?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 907-920, June.
    9. Beck, Thorsten & Klapper, Leora F. & Mendoza, Juan Carlos, 2010. "The typology of partial credit guarantee funds around the world," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 10-25, April.
    10. Francesco Reito, 2011. "Unproductive Investment And Rent Extraction," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 213-230, July.
    11. N. S. Chiteji, 2002. "Promises kept: enforcement and the role of rotating savings and credit associations in an economy," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 393-411.
    12. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    13. Pascaline Dupas & Jonathan Robinson, 2013. "Savings Constraints and Microenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 163-192, January.
    14. Carpenter, Seth B & Jensen, Robert T, 2002. "Household Participation in Formal and Informal Savings Mechanisms: Evidence from Pakistan," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 314-328, October.
    15. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank concentration, competition, and crises: First results," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1581-1603, May.
    16. Columba, Francesco & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2010. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-54, April.
    17. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1992. "Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets and Its Implications for Macro-economics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 694-724, October.
    18. Anderson, Siwan & Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove, 2009. "Enforcement in informal saving groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 14-23, September.
    19. Karna Basu, 2011. "Hyperbolic Discounting and the Sustainability of Rotational Savings Arrangements," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 143-171, November.
    20. Stefan Klonner, 2003. "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations When Participants are Risk Averse," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 979-1005, August.
    21. Maria De Gobbi, 2003. "Mutual Guarantee Associations for Small and Micro‐Entrepreneurs: Lessons Learned from Europe and Africa," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 15(1), pages 23-34.
    22. Tomomi Tanaka & Takeshi Murooka, 2012. "Self‐Control Problems And Consumption‐Saving Decisions: Theory And Empirical Evidence," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 23-37, March.
    23. Ted K. Bradshaw, 2002. "The Contribution of Small Business Loan Guarantees to Economic Development," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 16(4), pages 360-369, November.
    24. Gugerty, Mary Kay, 2007. "You Can't Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 251-282, January.
    25. Bouman, F. J. A., 1995. "Rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations: A development perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 371-384, March.
    26. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    27. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 4(3), pages 351-366, September.
    28. Handa, Sudhanshu & Kirton, Claremont, 1999. "The economics of rotating savings and credit associations: evidence from the Jamaican 'Partner'," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 173-194, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rabie, Dina, 2021. "RoSCAs in Egypt: A Banking Institution or a Commitment Device?," ILE Working Paper Series 52, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    2. AMANKWAH, ERNEST & Gockel, Fritz Augustine & Osei-Assibey, Eric, 2019. "Pareto Superior dimension of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in Ghana: Evidence from Asunafo North Municipality of Ghana," MPRA Paper 96308, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kyle McNabb & Philippe LeMay-Boucher & Jacopo Bonan, 2019. "Enforcement Problems in ROSCAs: Evidence from Benin," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 31(5), pages 1389-1415, December.
    4. Pascaline Dupas & Jonathan Robinson, 2013. "Why Don't the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1138-1171, June.
    5. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
    6. Eun Jin Ryu & Aya Suzuki, 2021. "ROSCAS as Insurance: Comparing Formal and Informal Methods of Saving among the Unskilled Workers in the Ethiopian Cut‐Flower Industry," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 59(3), pages 243-274, September.
    7. Karna Basu, 2011. "Hyperbolic Discounting and the Sustainability of Rotational Savings Arrangements," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 143-171, November.
    8. Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, 2022. "On the optimal size of a joint savings association," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 804-814.
    9. Murizah Osman Salleh & Aziz Jaafar & M. Shahid Ebrahim, 2012. "Can an interest-free credit facility be more efficient than a usurious payday loan?," Working Papers 12008, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    10. Baland, Jean-Marie & Guirkinger, Catherine & Hartwig, Renate, 2019. "Now or later? The allocation of the pot and the insurance motive in fixed roscas," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 1-11.
    11. Adnan Shoaib & Muhammad Ayub Siddiqui, 2020. "Why do people participate in ROSCA saving schemes? Findings from a qualitative empirical study," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 47(2), pages 177-189, June.
    12. Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe Lemay‐Boucher, 2012. "Rosca Participation in Benin: A Commitment Issue," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 74(2), pages 235-252, April.
    13. Fenella Carpena & Shawn Cole & Jeremy Shapiro & Bilal Zia, 2013. "Liability Structure in Small-Scale Finance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 27(3), pages 437-469.
    14. Ha van Dung, 2014. "Short-term precaution, insurance and saving mechanisms in rural Vietnam," Working Papers CIE 82, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    15. Olivier Dagnelie & Philippe LeMay-Boucher, 2007. "ROSCA Participation in Benin: A Commitment Issue," CERT Discussion Papers 0708, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    16. Pushkar Maitra & Ray Miller & Ashish Sedai, 2022. "Household Welfare Effects of ROSCAs," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    17. Alessio Bongiovanni & Cristina Rovera, 2018. "The Determinants of the Confidi Delinquency Rate," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(4), pages 1-87, March.
    18. Kwangchul Ji & Hong-Youl Ha, 2021. "Empirical Evidence of Risks of Public-Loan Finance: Comparison between Self-Employers and SMEs," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-21, June.
    19. Ademola Abimbola. O & Ben-Caleb Egbide & Adegboyegun Adekunle. E & Eluyela Damilola. F & Falaye Adebanjo. J & Ajayi Abiodun. S., 2020. "Rotating and Savings Credit Association (ROSCAs): A Veritable Tool for Enhancing the Performance of Micro and Small Enterprises in Nigeria," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 10(2), pages 189-199, February.
    20. Abbi M Kedir & Richard Disney & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2011. "Why use ROSCAs when you can use banks? Theory, and evidence from Ethiopia," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/32, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jun 2011.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:deveco:v:52:y:2014:i:2:p:179-201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/idegvjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.