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Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Minke Remmerswaal & Jan Boone & Rudy Douven, 2019. "Selection and moral hazard effects in healthcare," CPB Discussion Paper 393, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  2. Yan Zheng & Tomislav Vukina & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2021. "Risk aversion, moral hazard, and gender differences in health care utilization," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 46(1), pages 35-60, March.
  3. Zheng, Yan & Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2016. "Estimating Asymmetric Information Effects in Health Care Accounting for the Transactions Costs," ARE Working Papers 262941, North Carolina State University, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  4. Nathan Kettlewell, 2019. "Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 989-1017, December.
  5. Philippe De Donder & Marie‐Louise Leroux, 2021. "Long term care insurance with state‐dependent preferences," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(12), pages 3074-3086, December.
  6. Powell, David & Goldman, Dana, 2021. "Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 141-160.
  7. Sengupta, Reshmi & Rooj, Debasis, 2019. "The effect of health insurance on hospitalization: Identification of adverse selection, moral hazard and the vulnerable population in the Indian healthcare market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 110-129.
  8. Minke Remmerswaal & Jan Boone, 2020. "A Structural Microsimulation Model for Demand-Side Cost-Sharing in Healthcare," CPB Discussion Paper 415.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  9. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Stephen P. Ryan & Paul Schrimpf & Mark R. Cullen, 2013. "Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 178-219, February.
  10. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
  11. Hossein Kavand & Marcel Voia, 2018. "Estimation of Health Care Demand and its Implication on Income Effects of Individuals," Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics, in: William H. Greene & Lynda Khalaf & Paul Makdissi & Robin C. Sickles & Michael Veall & Marcel-Cristia (ed.), Productivity and Inequality, pages 275-304, Springer.
  12. Aistov, Andrey V. (Аистов, Андрей) & Aleksandrova, Ekaterina A. (Александрова, Екатерина), 2018. "Ex Post Moral Hazard in Private Health Insurance [Постконтрактный Оппортунизм На Рынке Добровольного Медицинского Страхования]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 148-181, June.
  13. Yan Zheng & Tomislav Vukina & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2019. "Estimating asymmetric information effects in health care with uninsurable costs," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 79-98, March.
  14. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
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