IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/tefoso/v163y2021ics0040162520313123.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Discovering dynamic adverse behavior of policyholders in the life insurance industry

Author

Listed:
  • Islam, Md Rafiqul
  • Liu, Shaowu
  • Biddle, Rhys
  • Razzak, Imran
  • Wang, Xianzhi
  • Tilocca, Peter
  • Xu, Guandong

Abstract

Adverse selection (AS) is one of the significant causes of market failure worldwide. Analysis and deep insights into the Australian life insurance market show the existence of adverse activities to gain financial benefits, resulting in loss to insurance companies. Understanding the behavior of policyholders is essential to improve business strategies and overcome fraudulent claims. However, policyholders’ behavior analysis is a complex process, usually involving several factors depending on their preferences and the nature of data such as data which is missing useful private information, the presence of asymmetric information of policyholders, the existence of anomalous information at the cell level rather than the data instance level and a lack of quantitative research. This study aims to analyze the life insurance policyholder’s behavior to identify adverse behavior (AB). In this study, we present a novel association rule learning-based approach ‘ARLAS’ to detect the AS behavior of policyholders. In addition to the original data, we further created a synthetic AS dataset by randomly flipping the attribute values of 10% of the records in the test set. The experiment results on 31,800 Australian life insurance users show that the proposed approach achieves significant gains in performance comparatively.

Suggested Citation

  • Islam, Md Rafiqul & Liu, Shaowu & Biddle, Rhys & Razzak, Imran & Wang, Xianzhi & Tilocca, Peter & Xu, Guandong, 2021. "Discovering dynamic adverse behavior of policyholders in the life insurance industry," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:163:y:2021:i:c:s0040162520313123
    DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120486
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162520313123
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120486?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bolhaar, Jonneke & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 669-690.
    2. Aquino, Karl & Douglas, Scott, 2003. "Identity threat and antisocial behavior in organizations: The moderating effects of individual differences, aggressive modeling, and hierarchical status," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 195-208, January.
    3. Nikita Singh & Manu Vardhan, 2019. "Distributed Ledger Technology based Property Transaction System with Support for IoT Devices," International Journal of Cloud Applications and Computing (IJCAC), IGI Global, vol. 9(2), pages 60-78, April.
    4. Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2019. "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 338-377.
    5. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1, pages 1-32, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Patrick Bajari & Christina Dalton & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2014. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 747-763, December.
    7. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
    8. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
    9. GholamReza Keshavarz Haddad & Mahdieh Zomorrodi Anbaji, 2010. "Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Health Insurance Market of Iran," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(4), pages 581-599, October.
    10. Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
    11. Sengupta, Reshmi & Rooj, Debasis, 2019. "The effect of health insurance on hospitalization: Identification of adverse selection, moral hazard and the vulnerable population in the Indian healthcare market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 110-129.
    12. Mark V. Pauly & Yuhui Zeng, 2004. "Adverse Selection and the Challenges to Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 7, pages 55-74, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Shweta Kaushik & Charu Gandhi, 2019. "Ensure Hierarchal Identity Based Data Security in Cloud Environment," International Journal of Cloud Applications and Computing (IJCAC), IGI Global, vol. 9(4), pages 21-36, October.
    14. Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2515-2547, December.
    15. Maria Polyakova, 2016. "Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 165-195, July.
    16. Chunhua Ju & Fuguang Bao & Chonghuan Xu & Xiaokang Fu, 2015. "A Novel Method of Interestingness Measures for Association Rules Mining Based on Profit," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2015, pages 1-10, July.
    17. Xin‐Ping Song & Zhi‐Hua Hu & Jian‐Guo Du & Zhao‐Han Sheng, 2014. "Application of Machine Learning Methods to Risk Assessment of Financial Statement Fraud: Evidence from China," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(8), pages 611-626, December.
    18. Pauly Mark V. & Zeng Yuhui, 2004. "Adverse Selection and the Challenges to Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Insurance," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-22, January.
    19. Georg Meyer & Gediminas Adomavicius & Paul E. Johnson & Mohamed Elidrisi & William A. Rush & JoAnn M. Sperl-Hillen & Patrick J. O'Connor, 2014. "A Machine Learning Approach to Improving Dynamic Decision Making," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(2), pages 239-263, June.
    20. P. K. Viswanathan & Suresh Srinivasan & N. Hariharan, 2020. "Predicting Financial Health of Banks for Investor Guidance Using Machine Learning Algorithms," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 19(2), pages 226-261, August.
    21. Mary Riddel & David Hales, 2018. "Risk Misperceptions And Selection In Insurance Markets: An Application To Demand For Cancer Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 85(3), pages 749-785, September.
    22. Oladayo Olufemi Olakanmi & Adedamola Dada, 2019. "An Efficient Privacy-preserving Approach for Secure Verifiable Outsourced Computing on Untrusted Platforms," International Journal of Cloud Applications and Computing (IJCAC), IGI Global, vol. 9(2), pages 79-98, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Odunayo Olarewaju & Thabiso Msomi, 2021. "Determinants of Insurance Penetration in West African Countries: A Panel Auto Regressive Distributed Lag Approach," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-15, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nathan Kettlewell, 2019. "Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 989-1017, December.
    2. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    3. Kurt Lavetti & Kosali Simon, 2018. "Strategic Formulary Design in Medicare Part D Plans," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 154-192, August.
    4. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
    5. Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
    6. Posey, Lisa L. & Thistle, Paul D., 2021. "Genetic testing and genetic discrimination: Public policy when insurance becomes “too expensive”," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Patricia H. Born & E. Tice Sirmans, 2020. "Restrictive Rating and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 919-933, December.
    8. Andrey Aistov & Ekaterina Aleksandrova & Christopher J. Gerry, 2021. "Voluntary private health insurance, health-related behaviours and health outcomes: evidence from Russia," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(2), pages 281-309, March.
    9. Doiron, Denise & Fiebig, Denzil G. & Suziedelyte, Agne, 2014. "Hips and hearts: The variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 81-97.
    10. De La Mata, Dolores & Machado, Matilde P. & Olivella, Pau & Valdés, Maria Nieves, 2022. "Asymmetric Information with multiple risks: the case of the Chilean Private Health Insurance Market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 35441, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
    12. Sengupta, Reshmi & Rooj, Debasis, 2019. "The effect of health insurance on hospitalization: Identification of adverse selection, moral hazard and the vulnerable population in the Indian healthcare market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 110-129.
    13. Carey, Colleen, 2021. "Sharing the burden of subsidization: Evidence on pass-through from a subsidy revision in Medicare Part D," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    14. Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2017. "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(1), pages 5-30, January.
    15. Jan Michael Bauer & Jörg Schiller & Christopher Schreckenberger, 2020. "Heterogeneous selection in the market for private supplemental dental insurance: evidence from Germany," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 205-231, July.
    16. Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2015. "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 757, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    17. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:163:y:2021:i:c:s0040162520313123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00401625 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.