Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bolhaar, Jonneke
  • Lindeboom, Maarten
  • van der Klaauw, Bas

Abstract

We find that asymmetric information is important for the uptake of supplementary private health insurance and health care utilization. We use dynamic panel data models to investigate the sources of asymmetric information and distinguish short-run selection effects into insurance from long-run selection effects. Short-run selection effects (i.e. responses to shocks) are adverse, but small in size. Also long-run effects driven by differences in, for example, preferences and risk aversion, are small. But we find some evidence for multidimensional asymmetric information. For example, mental health causes advantageous selection. Estimates of health care utilization models suggest that moral hazard is not important.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001429211200044X
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 56 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 669-690

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:4:p:669-690

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

Related research

Keywords: Supplementary private health insurance; Health care utilization; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard; Panel data;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Meer, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S., 2004. "Insurance and the utilization of medical services," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(9), pages 1623-1632, May.
  2. Wolfe, John R. & Goddeeris, John H., 1991. "Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-459.
  3. Alberto HOLLY & Lucien GARDIOL & Gianfranco DOMENIGHETTI & Brigitte BISIG, 1998. "An Econometric Model of Health Care Utilization and Health Insurance in Switzerland," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 9803, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  4. De Meza, D. & Webb, D.C., 2000. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Market," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 0007, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  5. Cameron, A C & P. K. Trivedi & Frank Milne & J. Piggott, 1988. "A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 85-106, January.
  6. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Durand, Franck & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 1998. "Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 499-511, May.
  7. Bundorf M. Kate & Herring Bradley & Pauly Mark V., 2010. "Health Risk, Income, and Employment-Based Health Insurance," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-35, September.
  8. Liu, Tsai-Ching & Chen, Chin-Shyan, 2002. "An analysis of private health insurance purchasing decisions with national health insurance in Taiwan," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 755-774, September.
  9. Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, 2008. "The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1083-1102, June.
  10. Savage, Elizabeth & Wright, Donald J., 2003. "Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian private hospitals: 1989-1990," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 331-359, May.
  11. Mark Stabile, 2001. "Private insurance subsidies and public health care markets: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(4), pages 921-942, November.
  12. Winfried Pohlmeier & Volker Ulrich, 1995. "An Econometric Model of the Two-Part Decisionmaking Process in the Demand for Health Care," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 30(2), pages 339-361.
  13. David M. Cutler & Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Andrew M. JONES & Xander KOOLMAN & Eddy VAN DOORSLAER, 2006. "The impact of having supplementary private health insurance on the uses of specialists," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 251-275.
  15. Khwaja, Ahmed & Silverman, Dan & Sloan, Frank & Wang, Yang, 2007. "Smoking, wealth accumulation and the propensity to plan," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 96-103, January.
  16. Nolan, Brian & Gannon, Brenda & Layte, Richard & Watson, Dorothy & Whelan, Christopher T. & Williams, James, 2002. "Monitoring Poverty Trends in Ireland: Results from the 2000 Living in Ireland survey," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number PRS45.
  17. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-27, Autumn.
  19. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
  20. Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
  21. Colm Harmon & Brian Nolan, 2001. "Health insurance and health services utilization in Ireland," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(2), pages 135-145.
  22. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November.
  23. Hurd, Michael D. & McGarry, Kathleen, 1997. "Medical insurance and the use of health care services by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 129-154, April.
  24. Propper, Carol, 1993. "Constrained choice sets in the U.K. demand for private medical insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 287-307, July.
  25. Francesca Colombo & Nicole Tapay, 2004. "Private Health Insurance in Ireland: A Case Study," OECD Health Working Papers 10, OECD Publishing.
  26. Jonathan Gruber & James M. Poterba, 1993. "Tax Incentives and the Decision to Purchase Health Insurance: Evidence from the Self-Employed," NBER Working Papers 4435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Cutler, David & McGarry, Kathleen & Finkelstein, Amy, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," Scholarly Articles 2640581, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  28. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  30. Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
  31. �ngel Marcos Vera-Hernández, 1999. "Duplicate coverage and demand for health care. The case of Catalonia," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(7), pages 579-598.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Denise Doiron & Denzil G Fiebig & Agne Suziedelyte, 2013. "Hips and hearts: the variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2013-14, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  2. Carine Franc & Marc Perronnin & Aurelie Pierre, 2014. "Supplemental Health Insurance and Healthcare Consumption: A Dynamic Approach to Moral Hazard," Working Papers, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics DT58, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jan 2014.
  3. Johar, Meliyanni & Savage, Elizabeth, 2012. "Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence using actual health expenditure risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 579-582.
  4. Kiil, Astrid, 2012. "Private health insurance and the use of health care services - a review of the theoretical literature with application to voluntary private health insurance in universal health care systems," COHERE Working Paper 2012:1, COHERE - Centre of Health Economics Research, University of Southern Denmark.
  5. Jeon, Boyoung & Kwon, Soonman, 2013. "Effect of private health insurance on health care utilization in a universal public insurance system: A case of South Korea," Health Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 69-76.
  6. Perronnin, Marc, 2013. "Effet de l'assurance complémentaire santé sur les consommations médicales, entre risque moral et amélioration de l'accès aux soins," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/13659 edited by Wittwer, Jérôme.
  7. Valerie Albouy & Laurent Davezies & Thierry Debrand, 2009. "Dynamic Estimation of Health Expenditure: A new approach for simulating individual expenditure," Working Papers, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics DT20, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jan 2009.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:4:p:669-690. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.