IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormksc/v36y2017i3p338-360.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Dynamic Model of Health Insurance Choices and Healthcare Consumption Decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Nitin Mehta

    (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6, Canada)

  • Jian Ni

    (Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202)

  • Kannan Srinivasan

    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213)

  • Baohong Sun

    (Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, New York, New York 10022)

Abstract

Chronic diseases, which account for 75% of healthcare expenditure, are of particular importance in trying to understand the rapid growth of healthcare costs over the last few decades. Individuals suffering from chronic diseases can consume three types of services: secondary preventive care, which includes diagnostic tests; primary preventive care, which consists of drugs that help prevent the illness from getting worse; and curative care, which includes surgeries and expensive drugs that provide a quantum boost to the patient’s health. Although the majority of cases can be managed by preventive care, most consumers opt for more expensive curative care that leads to a substantial increase in overall costs. To examine these inefficiencies, we build a model of consumers’ annual medical insurance plan decisions and periodic consumption decisions and apply it to a panel data set. Our results indicate that there exists a sizable segment of consumers who purchase more comprehensive plans than needed because of high uncertainty vis-à-vis their health status, and that once in the plan, they opt for curative care even when their illness could be managed through preventive care. We examine how changing cost-sharing characteristics of insurance plans and providing more accurate information to consumers via secondary preventive care can reduce these inefficiencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Nitin Mehta & Jian Ni & Kannan Srinivasan & Baohong Sun, 2017. "A Dynamic Model of Health Insurance Choices and Healthcare Consumption Decisions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 338-360, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:36:y:2017:i:3:p:338-360
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2016.1021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2016.1021
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mksc.2016.1021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aviva Aron-Dine & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark Cullen, 2015. "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 725-741, October.
    2. Sridhar Narayanan & Puneet Manchanda, 2009. "Heterogeneous Learning and the Targeting of Marketing Communication for New Products," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 424-441, 05-06.
    3. Strombom, Bruce A. & Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Feldstein, Paul J., 2002. "Switching costs, price sensitivity and health plan choice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 89-116, January.
    4. Eric J Johnson & Ran Hassin & Tom Baker & Allison T Bajger & Galen Treuer, 2013. "Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(12), pages 1-6, December.
    5. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Stephen P. Ryan & Paul Schrimpf & Mark R. Cullen, 2013. "Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 178-219, February.
    6. Donna B. Gilleskie, 1998. "A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Medical Care Use and Work Absence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(1), pages 1-46, January.
    7. Andrew Ching & Masakazu Ishihara, 2010. "The effects of detailing on prescribing decisions under quality uncertainty," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 123-165, June.
    8. Shapira, Zur & Venezia, Itzhak, 2008. "On the preference for full-coverage policies: Why do people buy too much insurance?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 747-761, November.
    9. Gregory S. Crawford & Matthew Shum, 2005. "Uncertainty and Learning in Pharmaceutical Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(4), pages 1137-1173, July.
    10. repec:mpr:mprres:2864 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Johnson, Eric J & Hershey, John & Meszaros, Jacqueline & Kunreuther, Howard, 1993. "Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 35-51, August.
    12. Gupta, Aparna & Li, Zhisheng, 2011. "Calibration of a stochastic health evolution model using NHIS data," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(20), pages 3524-3540.
    13. Keane, Michael P & Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1994. "The Solution and Estimation of Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Models by Simulation and Interpolation: Monte Carlo Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(4), pages 648-672, November.
    14. Tat Y. Chan & Barton H. Hamilton, 2006. "Learning, Private Information, and the Economic Evaluation of Randomized Experiments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 997-1040, December.
    15. Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler, 2013. "Anomalies: Risk aversion," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 27, pages 467-480, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    16. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Iuliana Pascu & Mark R. Cullen, 2012. "How General Are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2606-2638, October.
    17. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
    18. Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2003. "Structural Estimation of a Principal-Agent Model: Moral Hazard in Medical Insurance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 670-693, Winter.
    19. Grossman, Michael, 1972. "On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(2), pages 223-255, March-Apr.
    20. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 2011. "How individuals choose health insurance: An experimental analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 799-819, August.
    21. A. C. Cameron & P. K. Trivedi & Frank Milne & J. Piggott, 1988. "A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 85-106.
    22. Stefan Felder & Thomas Mayrhofer, 2011. "Medical Decision Making," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-642-18330-0, December.
    23. H. Llewellyn-Thomas & H.J. Sutherland & R. Tibshirani & A. Ciampi & J.E. Till & N.F. Boyd, 1982. "The Measurement of Patients' Values in Medicine," Medical Decision Making, , vol. 2(4), pages 449-462, December.
    24. Patrick Bajari & Christina Dalton & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2014. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 747-763, December.
    25. Benjamin R. Handel, 2013. "Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2643-2682, December.
    26. Andrew Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael Keane, 2009. "The price consideration model of brand choice," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(3), pages 393-420, April.
    27. John R. Hauser, 1978. "Testing the Accuracy, Usefulness, and Significance of Probabilistic Choice Models: An Information-Theoretic Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(3), pages 406-421, June.
    28. Khwaja, Ahmed, 2010. "Estimating willingness to pay for medicare using a dynamic life-cycle model of demand for health insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 156(1), pages 130-147, May.
    29. Juanjuan Zhang, 2010. "The Sound of Silence: Observational Learning in the U.S. Kidney Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(2), pages 315-335, 03-04.
    30. Nitin Mehta & Xinlei (Jack) Chen & Om Narasimhan, 2008. "Informing, Transforming, and Persuading: Disentangling the Multiple Effects of Advertising on Brand Choice Decisions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 334-355, 05-06.
    31. A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), 2000. "Handbook of Health Economics," Handbook of Health Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    32. Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-427, Autumn.
    33. Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 1993. "Investigating Purchase Incidence, Brand Choice and Purchase Quantity Decisions of Households," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 184-208.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zeng, Fue & Ye, Qing & Li, Jing & Yang, Zhilin, 2021. "Does self-disclosure matter? A dynamic two-stage perspective for the personalization-privacy paradox," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 667-675.
    2. Hongfei Li & Jing Peng & Xinxin Li & Jan Stallaert, 2023. "When More Can Be Less: The Effect of Add-On Insurance on the Consumption of Professional Services," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 363-382, March.
    3. Zhou, Cuihua & Lan, Yanfei & Li, Weifeng & Zhao, Ruiqing, 2022. "Medicare policies in a two-Tier healthcare system with overtreatment," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    4. Martin Mende, 2019. "The innovation imperative in healthcare: an interview and commentary," AMS Review, Springer;Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 9(1), pages 121-131, June.
    5. Kappe, Eelco & Stadler Blank, Ashley & DeSarbo, Wayne S., 2018. "A random coefficients mixture hidden Markov model for marketing research," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 415-431.
    6. Marco Remondino, 2018. "Information Technology in Healthcare: HHC-MOTES, a Novel Set of Metrics to Analyse IT Sustainability in Different Areas," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-20, August.
    7. Chen, Hua & Ding, Yugang & Tang, Lin & Wang, Lizhen, 2022. "Impact of urban–rural medical insurance integration on consumption: Evidence from rural China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 837-851.
    8. Sun, Huan & Wang, Haiyan & Steffensen, Sonja, 2022. "Mechanism design of multi-strategy health insurance plans under asymmetric information," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2013. "Invited Paper ---Learning Models: An Assessment of Progress, Challenges, and New Developments," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(6), pages 913-938, November.
    2. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2013. "Learning Models: An Assessment of Progress, Challenges and New Developments," Economics Papers 2013-W07, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    3. Song Lin & Juanjuan Zhang & John R. Hauser, 2015. "Learning from Experience, Simply," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, January.
    4. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    5. Kowalski, Amanda E., 2015. "Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 122-135.
    6. Haizhen Lin & Daniel W. Sacks, 2016. "Intertemporal Substitution in Health Care Demand: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment," NBER Working Papers 22802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Lin, Haizhen & Sacks, Daniel W., 2019. "Intertemporal substitution in health care demand: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 29-43.
    8. Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg & Amitabh Chandra & Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2017. "What does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 132(3), pages 1261-1318.
    9. Powell, David & Goldman, Dana, 2021. "Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 141-160.
    10. Sengupta, Reshmi & Rooj, Debasis, 2019. "The effect of health insurance on hospitalization: Identification of adverse selection, moral hazard and the vulnerable population in the Indian healthcare market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 110-129.
    11. Nathan Kettlewell, 2019. "Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 989-1017, December.
    12. Yan Zheng & Tomislav Vukina & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2019. "Estimating asymmetric information effects in health care with uninsurable costs," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 79-98, March.
    13. Zheng, Yan & Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2016. "Estimating Asymmetric Information Effects in Health Care Accounting for the Transactions Costs," ARE Working Papers 262941, North Carolina State University, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    14. Mariacristina De Nardi & Eric French & John Bailey Jones, 2016. "Medicaid Insurance in Old Age," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3480-3520, November.
    15. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    16. Bernal, Noelia & Carpio, Miguel A. & Klein, Tobias J., 2017. "The effects of access to health insurance: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Peru," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 122-136.
    17. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2017. "Empirical Models of Learning Dynamics: A Survey of Recent Developments," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Berend Wierenga & Ralf van der Lans (ed.), Handbook of Marketing Decision Models, edition 2, chapter 0, pages 223-257, Springer.
    18. Yan Huang & Param Vir Singh & Kannan Srinivasan, 2014. "Crowdsourcing New Product Ideas Under Consumer Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(9), pages 2138-2159, September.
    19. Michael Darden, 2017. "Smoking, Expectations, and Health: A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Lifetime Smoking Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(5), pages 1465-1522.
    20. Juan Pablo Atal & Hanming Fang & Martin Karlsson & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2019. "Exit, Voice, or Loyalty? An Investigation Into Mandated Portability of Front‐Loaded Private Health Plans," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(3), pages 697-727, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:36:y:2017:i:3:p:338-360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.