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Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots

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Author Info

  • Sieg, Gernot

Abstract

Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department in its series Economics Department Working Paper Series with number 4.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:tbswps:4

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Web page: https://www.tu-braunschweig.de/vwl
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Related research

Keywords: Airports; Grandfather rights; use-it-or-lose-it rule; airport slots;

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References

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  1. Abeyratne, Ruwantissa I.R., 2000. "Management of airport congestion through slot allocation," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 29-41.
  2. Jan K. Brueckner & Raquel Girvin, 2006. "Airport Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, and Social Welfare," Working Papers 060706, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  3. Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin, 2006. "Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 229-247, September.
  4. Barbot, Cristina, 2004. "Economic effects of re-allocating airports slots: a vertical differentiation approach," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 333-343.
  5. Ian Jones & Ivan Viehoff & Phillipa Marks, 1993. "The economics of airport slots," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 37-57, November.
  6. Starkie, David, 1998. "Allocating airport slots: a role for the market?," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 111-116.
  7. Pels, Eric & Verhoef, Erik T., 2004. "The economics of airport congestion pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 257-277, March.
  8. Button, Kenneth, 2005. "A simple analysis of the rent seeking of airlines, airports and politicians," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, January.
  9. Jan K. Brueckner, 2002. "Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1357-1375, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot, 2012. "No need to regulate airports with predominantly non-aeronautical revenues," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 52, pages 7.
  2. Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot, 2009. "When to regulate airports: A simple rule," Economics Department Working Paper Series 6, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
  3. Alessandro Avenali & Tiziana D'Alfonso & Claudio Leporelli & Giorgio Matteucci & Alberto Nastasi & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2014. "A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-03, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
  4. Irem Batool & Gernot Sieg, 2009. "Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 151-165, October.

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