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Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power

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Author Info
Jan K. Brueckner

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Abstract

This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 92 (2002)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1357-1375
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:5:p:1357-1375

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Christopher Mayer & Todd Sinai, 2002. "Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and Air Traffic Delays: Or Why All Delays Are Not Evil," NBER Working Papers 8701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Carlin, Alan & Park, Rolla Edward, 1970. "Marginal Cost Pricing of Airport Runway Capacity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 310-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Buchanan, James M, 1969. "External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 174-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Small, K.A. & Gomez-Ibanez, J.A., 1996. "Urban Transportation," Papers 95-96-4, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    Other versions:
  5. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas, 1991. "Mobility and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 828-58, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Borenstein, Severin & Rose, Nancy L, 1994. "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 653-83, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Daniel, Joseph I. & Pahwa, Munish, 2000. "Comparison of Three Empirical Models of Airport Congestion Pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Daniel, Joseph I, 1995. "Congestion Pricing and Capacity of Large Hub Airports: A Bottleneck Model with Stochastic Queues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 327-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, 2007. "How Airline Markets Work...Or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry," NBER Working Papers 13452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jan K. Brueckner, 2002. "Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Joseph I. Daniel & Katherine Thomas Harback, 2005. "Do Airlines that Dominate Traffic at Hub Airports Experience Less Delay?," Working Papers 05-09, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jan K. Brueckner, 2008. "Slot-Based Approaches to Airport Congestion Management," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Harumi Ito & Darin Lee, 2003. "Assessing the Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Airline Demand," Working Papers 2003-16, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Mark Lijesen & Peter Nijkamp & Eric Pels, 2005. "The Home Carrier Advantage in Civil Aviation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-011/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. Achim I. Czerny, 2006. "Congestion Pricing vs. Slot Constraints to Airport Networks," Working Papers 2006-02, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI). [Downloadable!]
  8. isamu matsukawa, 2005. "Congestion pricing of inputs in vertically related markets," Industrial Organization 0506012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. De Borger B. & Proost S. & Van Dender K., 2007. "Private Port Pricing and Public Investment in Port and Hinterland Capacity," Working Papers 2007019, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Achim I. Czerny, 2007. "Congestion management under uncertainty in a two-airport system," Working Papers 2007-01, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI). [Downloadable!]
  11. Fay Dunkerley & André de Palma & Stef Proost, 2007. "Spatial asymmetric duopoly with an application to Brussels’ airports," THEMA Working Papers 2007-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  12. Harumi Ito & Darin Lee, 2003. "Low Cost Carrier Growth in the U.S. Airline Industry: Past, Present, and Future," Working Papers 2003-12, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Joseph I Daniel & Katherine Thomas Harback, . "Pricing the major hub airports," Working Papers 08-13, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Christopher Mayer & Todd Sinai, 2003. "Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and Air Traffic Delays: Or Why Not All Delays Are Evil," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1194-1215, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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