Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs
AbstractThis study analyzes the minimum quality standard set by the European Union (EU) through Regulation 1371/2007 of Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations. A welfare maximizing quality standard raises quality and consumer satisfaction, but does not improve the modal split of rail transport. A minimum quality standard determined by political majorities may or may not increase welfare. However, all binding standards induce travelers to switch to transport modes with higher anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department in its series Economics Department Working Paper Series with number 8.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
regulation; minimum quality standards; median; rail;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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