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Mehraufgaben-Prinzipal-Agenten-Analyse: Effiziente Arbeitsverträge für abwechslungsbegrüßende Arbeitnehmer

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  • Neunzig, Alexander R.
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    Abstract

    Für die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie ist es ein weitgehend ungelöstes Rätsel, warum reale Arbeitsverträge sehr geringe monetäre Leistungsanreize spezifizieren. In dieser Arbeit wird auf der Grundlage des Prinzipal-Agenten-Ansatzes ein Modell entwickelt, dass sowohl Fixlohnverträge als auch Anreizverträge erklären kann, die eine geringe Leistungsabhängigkeit beinhalten. Hierzu wird auf das grundlegende Mehraufgaben-Modell von Holmström und Milgrom (1991) zurückgegriffen und vereinfacht dargestellt. Zudem wird es durch die Überlegung erweitert, dass Arbeitnehmer eine Präferenz für abwechslungsreiche Tätigkeiten besitzen. Es werden Schlüsse in Bezug auf eine effiziente Vertragsgestaltung, die beobachtbare Vertragsvielfalt sowie die Arbeitsplatzgestaltung gezogen. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2002-04.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200204

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    Keywords: Principal-agent-theory; personnel economics; contract theory; intrinsic motivation; job satisfaction; economic psychology; multi-task analysis;

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