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Effiziente Fixlohnverträge für arbeitsfreudige Arbeitnehmer mit Berichtspflichten

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  • Neunzig, Alexander R.
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    Abstract

    Für die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie ist es ein weitgehend ungelöstes Rätsel, warum reale Arbeitsverträge sehr geringe monetäre Leistungsanreize spezifizieren. In dieser Arbeit wird auf der Grundlage des Prinzipal-Agenten-Ansatzes ein Modell entwickelt, dass Fixlohnverträge erklären kann. Hierzu wird einerseits angenommen, dass Arbeitnehmer nicht nur Arbeitsleid, sondern auch Arbeitsfreude empfinden. Zudem wird angenommen, dass die Leistung eines Arbeitnehmers durch Überwachungsorgane kontrolliert und sanktioniert wird. Da eine derartige Anreizgestaltung dazu führen kann, dass Arbeitnehmer einen Teil ihrer Arbeitszeit für unproduktive berichtende Tätigkeiten verwenden, ist möglicherweise ein Verzicht auf Überwachung die effiziente zweitbeste Vertragsform. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2002-05.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200205

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    Related research

    Keywords: Principal-agent-theory; personnel economics; contract theory; intrinsic motivation; job satisfaction; economic psychology; supervision;

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