Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy
AbstractWe describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents, where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 533.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Pollution Abatement ; Emission Taxes ; Investment Subsidies;
Other versions of this item:
- Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 617-635, October.
- Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, . "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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