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Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy

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Author Info
Abrego, Lisandro
Perroni, Carlo

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Abstract

We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents, where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp533.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 533.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:533

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Related research
Keywords: Pollution Abatement ; Emission Taxes ; Investment Subsidies;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Francesco Ferrante, . "Induced Technical Change, Scientific Advance and the Efficient Control of Pollution," Discussion Papers 96/4, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Agostini, Paola & Botteon, Michele & Carraro, Carlo, 1992. "A carbon tax to reduce CO2 emissions in Europe," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 279-290, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jorgenson, D.W. & Slesnick, D. & Wilcoxen, P.J., 1992. "Carbon Taxes and Economic Welfare," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1589, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Larry Karp & Jiangfeng Zhang, 2008. "Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 1064, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christophe Deissenberg & Herbert Dawid & Pavel Sevcik, 2004. "Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game," Working Papers 2004.137, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard Mash & Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn, 2003. "Time Inconsistent Environmental Policy and Optimal Delegation," Economics Series Working Papers 175, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Grischa Perino, 2008. "The Design of Permit Schemes and Environmental Innovation," Working Papers 0467, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
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