This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Cournot Mechanism for Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ross McKitrick ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The contribution of this paper is to show that a simple nonlinear tax can achieve a long-run socially optimal level of pollution without the regulator knowing marginal abatement costs. Firms are charged their differential contribution to total damages, evaluated at the upper margin of current emissions. This induces a Cournot game in pollution levels. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists, corresponds to the socially optimal long-run output and emission levels and number of firms, is stable, and can be reached by iterative computations where conjectures are formed using a linear estimator based on past emission levels. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008397420322
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 14 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 353-363
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:14:y:1999:i:3:p:353-363

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: externalities; pollution taxes; differential damages; Cournot games;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 1990. "Iterative computation of cournot equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 61-75, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Karp Larry & Livernois John, 1994. "Using Automatic Tax Changes to Control Pollution Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Conrad, Klaus, 1991. "Incentive Mechanisms for Environmental Protection under Asymmetric Information: A Case Study," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 871-80, May.
  7. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(5), pages 857-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Shaffer, Sherrill, 1995. "Optimal Linear Taxation of Polluting Oligopolists," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 85-100, January.
  10. Fullerton, Don, 1997. "Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxes: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 245-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K & Quiggin, John, 1995. "Dynamic Pollution Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-44, July.
  12. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Fischer, Carolyn, 2003. "Market Power and Output-Based Refunding of Environmental Policy Revenues," Discussion Papers dp-03-27, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fischer, Carolyn, 2003. "Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and Imperfect Competition," Discussion Papers dp-02-60, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  3. Athanasios Kampas & Ben White, 2004. "Administrative Costs and Instrument Choice for Stochastic Non-point Source Pollutants," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(2), pages 109-133, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Paul Mensink, 2004. "Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited," Working Papers 2004.124, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.