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An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions

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Author Info
Juan Pablo Montero () (Instituto de Economía)

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Abstract

Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement).

Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their private information: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms.

This paper discuses further properties of the mechanism including its extension to the possibility of private externalities and non-transferability of licences.

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File URL: http://www.economia.puc.cl/index/download.asp?id_publicacion=1498
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía.

Volume (Year): 44 (2007)
Issue (Month): 130 ()
Pages: 141-150
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Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:44:y:2007:i:130:p:141-150

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Related research
Keywords: Externalities; Asymmetric Information; Uniform-Price Auction.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2008. "A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 496-518, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(5), pages 857-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, 1976. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem'," Discussion Papers 144, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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