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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 163-181
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:35:y:1988:i:2:p:163-181

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