An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets
AbstractThis paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
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