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A Very Simple Model of Conflict with Asymmetric Evaluations and Institutional Constraint

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  • Raul Caruso

    (Università Cattolica del Sacro cuore)

Abstract

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents conflict in order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. An institutional constraint is modelled through an exogenously fixed element as a feature of a modified Contest Success Function. However, this very simple model shows that even if conflicting agents are willing to commit themselves to ease the conflict joining an institutional setting they do not ‘disarm’. The findings of the model show that: (a) both agents prefer to settle under an institutional constraint if and only if an exogenous institutional fee is fixed under a critical value; (b) the critical value of the institutional fee is directly related to the evaluation of the stake each agent does retain; (c) the agents with a higher evaluation of the stake has a higher willingness to settle.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/pe/papers/0510/0510011.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0510011.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0510011

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 12
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Conflict; asymmetric evaluations; contest success function; institutional constraint;

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References

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  1. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 1997. "Trade and Security,I: Anarchy," NBER Working Papers 6223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1994. "Domestic Politics and International Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1294-1309, December.
  3. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  4. Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, EconWPA, revised 15 Dec 2004.
  5. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 50-68, March.
  6. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  7. Anderton, Charles H., 1999. "Appropriation possibilities in a simple exchange economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 77-83, April.
  8. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  9. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  10. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
  11. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 166-79, January.
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