The choice of a particular technology when there is a set of them available to firms has not appeared in the R&D literature yet. We show some examples and present a model in which firms choose their technologies from a continuum of available profiles and the resulting spillovers depend on the compatibility among firms' R&D technologies. Our results indicate that non-cooperating firms are interested in using the same or very similar technologies. Therefore firms seek to establish coordination mechanisms such as patent pools or Research Joint Ventures. A RJV leads to higher levels of social welfare than patent pools or the non-cooperative case.
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Muniagurria, Maria E & Singh, Nirvikar, 1997.
"Foreign Technology, Spillovers, and R&D Policy,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 405-30, May.
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