Surplus-Value, Distribution and Exploitation

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Surplus-Value, Distribution and Exploitation

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Alberto Battistini ()

Abstract

This paper introduces a notion of exploitation according to which participants in a cooperative production process are exploited to the extent that their earnings coincide with what they would earn from independent participation in the production process. This notion is then used to show that, in general, the institutional structure of production is not the solution to the problem of (opportunistic) exploitation, but may instead be the condition itself for its occurrence. Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost always created by the collective undertaking of non additively separable investments, the key to the result is to take groups as units of analysis in a Marx-inspired framework driven by the evolutionary principle of differential, multilevel profit realization

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 518.

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Date of creation: Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:518

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-11-17 (All new papers)

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