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Micro-Founded Institutions and Macro-Founded Individuals: The Dual Nature of Profit

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Author Info
Alberto Battistini ()
Abstract

Starting from the observation that surplus-value is almost always due to the collective undertaking of non additively separable human capital investments, this paper introduces a theory of the institutional structure of production where groups are taken as units of analysis in a multi-level competition framework inspired by Marx’s critique of the ‘abstract man’. The main result is that monopoly profit is not the only meaningful notion of profit besides the value of individual contribution and, as a consequence, freeentry and competition do not necessarily wipe it out

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 550.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:550

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Related research
Keywords: value; power; conflict; competition; social classes;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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    Other versions:
  2. Foss, Nicolai Juul, 1993. "Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 127-44, May.
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  7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," NBER Working Papers 9813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2005. "Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(1), pages 131-171, January.
    Other versions:
  14. Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1106, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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