The Network-Firm as a Single Real Entity: Beyond the Aggregate of Distinct Legal Entities
AbstractThis paper intends to depart from a critique of the nexus of contracts theory of the firm endowed with its moral personification to propose some theoretical foundations of the firm as a real entity. Some old legal views of the corporation are mobilized to complete the conceptual vacuity of economic theories. This provides crucial insights for modern complex organizations such as the network-firm. The integrating and unifying role of intra-network power relationships is then emphasized and some law and economics of the network-firm are ultimately proposed to clarify the argument that the network-firm − as the firm stricto sensu − is a singular real entity composed from distinct legal entities.
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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Publication status: Published - Presented, DRUID 25th Celebration International Conference 2008 on « Entrepreneurship and Innovation: Organizations, Institutions, Systems and Regions », 2008, Copenhague, Denmark
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Law and economics; contract theory of the firm; network-firm; legal fiction; real entity;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2009-04-25 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-04-25 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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