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Property Rights, Asset Specificity, and the Division of Labour under Alternative Capitalist Relations

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  • Pagano, Ugo

Abstract

Is the division of labor under capitalism because of transaction and technological efficiency or because of inefficient capitalist property rights? The answer of this paper is that under "classical" capitalism there is an inefficient division of labor because of underinvestment in asset-specific labor which can be improved by expanding workers' rights in two different ways defining "company workers" and "unionized" capitalism. An implication of the analysis is that markets, far from being the selection mechanism where efficient institutions evolve, may imply the reproduction of inefficient property rights and be shaped by them. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Cambridge Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 315-42

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Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:15:y:1991:i:3:p:315-42

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Cited by:
  1. Stephan R. Epstein, 1995. "Craft guilds, apprenticeship and technological change in pre-modern Europe," Economic History Working Papers 22419, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  2. Palma, J.G., 2012. "Was Brazil's recent growth acceleration the world's most overrated boom?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1248, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  3. Alberto Battistini, 2008. "Micro-Founded Institutions and Macro-Founded Individuals: The Dual Nature of Profit," Department of Economics University of Siena 550, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  4. Samuel Bowles, 2000. "Globalization and Redistribution: Feasible Egalitarianism in a Competitive World," Working Papers wp34, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  5. Alberto Battistini, 2007. "Surplus-Value, Distribution and Exploitation," Department of Economics University of Siena 518, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  6. Steven Kan & Chun-Sin Hwang, 1996. "A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-219, September.
  7. D'Antoni, Massimo & Pagano, Ugo, 2002. "National cultures and social protection as alternative insurance devices," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 367-386, December.
  8. Ermanno Tortia & Martha Knox Haly & Anthony Jensen, . "Workers' propensity to cooperate with colleagues and the general population: a comparison based on a field experiment," Econometica Working Papers wp52, Econometica.
  9. Navarra, Cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2013. "Employer moral hazard, wage rigidity and worker cooperatives: A theoretical appraisal," AICCON Working Papers 117-2013, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
  10. Elson, Diane, 1999. "Labor Markets as Gendered Institutions: Equality, Efficiency and Empowerment Issues," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 611-627, March.
  11. Doucouliagos, Chris, 1996. "Conformity, replication of design and business niches," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 45-62, July.
  12. Navarra Cecilia & Tortia Ermanno, 2011. "Employer’s moral hazard and the emergence of worker cooperatives," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201103, University of Turin.
  13. Knorringa, P. & Kox, H.L.M., 1992. "Transaction regimes : an instrument for research in industrial organization," Serie Research Memoranda 0034, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  14. Elson, Diane, 1995. "Gender Awareness in Modeling Structural Adjustment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(11), pages 1851-1868, November.
  15. Sauro Mocetti, 2004. "Social Protection and Human Capital: Test of a Hypothesis," Department of Economics University of Siena 425, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  16. Alberto Battistini, 2013. "A note on the difference between human and non-human productive factors: Comments on ‘Love, war, and culture: An institutional approach to human evolution’," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 67-70, April.
  17. Haagh, Louise, 2011. "Working Life, Well-Being and Welfare Reform: Motivation and Institutions Revisited," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 450-473, March.
  18. Metin M. Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, 1998. "On Job Rotation," Working papers 1998-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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