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Property enforcement as organized consent

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Abstract

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make property rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing the collateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast to contractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affected only with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement but is costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in the same asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consents to overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs: recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and even a regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionally similar services, but their relative performance varies with the number of transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatory consistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowing competition in the preparation and support of private contracts while requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registration activities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 564.

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Date of creation: Apr 2001
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:564

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: Transaction costs; property rights; real estate; land titles; recording; registration;

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Cited by:
  1. Benito Arruñada, 2014. "The titling role of possession," Economics Working Papers 1429, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Benito Arruñada, 2009. "The law of impersonal transactions," Economics Working Papers 1187, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
  3. Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2010. "Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 700-729, October.
  4. Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring Institutions: Is 'Doing Business' Damaging Business?," Working Papers 451, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Benito Arruñada, 2014. "The Titling Role of Possession," Working Papers 767, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  6. Benito Arruñada, 2005. "Managing competition in professional services and the burden of inertia," Economics Working Papers 827, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  7. Benito Arruñada, 2008. "Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies," Economics Working Papers 1090, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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