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Gestión de la competencia en el sector público

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Este trabajo analiza el papel de la competencia en la gestión pública, para lo cual toma como referencia la organización burocrática basada en centros de gasto que no cobran por sus servicios y suelen ser demasiado grandes e ineficientes. Para introducir competencia, se da libertad de elección a usuarios y productores, a la vez que se les responsabiliza de los costes que ocasionan sus decisiones. Se genera así un provechoso control mutuo entre usuarios y proveedores, que hace menos necesario el control jerárquico, de tipo vertical. Sin embargo, la eventual presencia de monopolios y asimetrías informativas puede ocasionar graves distorsiones y suele exigir una regulación activa, que es costosa y provoca búsqueda de rentas. Para corroborar la relevancia de este equilibrio de costes y beneficios, el trabajo analiza doce servicios públicos en los sectores de la sanidad, la educación y la justicia. Se constata la presencia de dificultades asociadas a monopolios, asimetrías informativas y búsqueda de rentas y se argumenta que, como consecuencia, se tienden a adoptar soluciones de naturaleza intermedia. Coherentemente con este argumento, se observa que en los servicios analizados o bien se emplean incentivos de baja intensidad o se restringen los derechos de decisión, de modo que no se aplican todos los elementos propios de la competencia pero tampoco se prescinde de ellos por completo. Por la moderación de los incentivos que genera, este uso incompleto de la competencia permite, además, que se puedan regular las actividades correspondientes mediante las fórmulas típicas de la Administración Pública, basadas en la reglamentación de decisiones recurrentes y la colegiación y supervisión jerárquica de un número pequeño de decisiones no regladas.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 490.

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Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:490

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: Public management; competition; public services; expense centers; bureaucracy;

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  1. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Heckling, 1995. "Specific And General Knowledge, And Organizational Structure," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(2), pages 4-18.
  2. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
  3. Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1999. "Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution," Economics Working Papers 424, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. Kraakman, Reiner H, 1986. "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 53-104, Spring.
  5. Thomas McGuire, 1981. "Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 313-322, January.
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