IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/15461_19.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Coase and the transaction cost approach to regulation

In: The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase

Author

Listed:
  • Marian W. Moszoro
  • Pablo T. Spiller

Abstract

Ronald H. Coase was one of the most innovative and provocative economists of the twentieth century. Besides his best known papers on ‘The Nature of the Firm’ and ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, he had a major role in the development of the field of law and economics, and made numerous influential contributions to topics including public utilities, regulation and the functioning of markets. In this comprehensive Companion, 31 leading economists, social scientists and legal scholars assess the impact of his work with particular reference to the research programs initiated, the influence on policymakers, and the challenge to conventional perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2016. "Coase and the transaction cost approach to regulation," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Elodie Bertrand (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase, chapter 19, pages 262-275, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15461_19
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781782547983.00030.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ronald H. Coase, 2008. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 2, pages 31-39, Springer.
    2. Pablo T. Spiller, 2009. "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Michel Ghertman (ed.), Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Stigler, George J, 1977. "The Conference Handbook," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 441-443, April.
    4. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2012. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts," NBER Working Papers 18636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    6. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    7. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    8. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-342, April.
    9. Richard A. Posner, 1972. "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(1), pages 98-129, Spring.
    10. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    12. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    13. Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), 2005. "Handbook of New Institutional Economics," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-0-387-25092-2, December.
    14. Ronald H. Coase, 1970. "The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(1), pages 113-128, Spring.
    15. Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant, 2014. "The manufacturing of markets: legal, political and economic dynamics," Post-Print hal-01492359, HAL.
    16. Brett M. Frischmann & Christiaan Hogendorn, 2015. "Retrospectives: The Marginal Cost Controversy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 193-206, Winter.
    17. Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-376, October.
    18. Usher, Dan, 1998. "The Coase theorem is tautological, incoherent or wrong," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-11, October.
    19. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    20. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1987. "Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 413-436.
    21. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    22. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    23. Halpin, Andrew, 2007. "Disproving The Coase Theorem?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 321-341, November.
    24. Pierre Guislain & Michel Kerf, 1995. "Concessions - The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector Monopolies," World Bank Publications - Reports 11648, The World Bank Group.
    25. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Hierarchical Regulatory Control," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 369-383, Autumn.
    26. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2014. "The Manufacturing of Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107053717.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kenneth Button, 2020. "Studying the empirical implications of the liberalization of airport markets," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 21(3), pages 223-243, September.
    2. Jean Beuve & Marian W Moszoro & Pablo T Spiller, 2023. "Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 281-308.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2018. "Implications of Third Parties for Contract Design," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 5-16, March.
    2. Moszoro Marian W., 2016. "Coasean Quality of Regulated Goods," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-13, October.
    3. Jean Beuve & Marian W. Moszoro & Stéphane Saussier, 2019. "Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 316-335, April.
    4. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    5. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    6. Marian Moszoro, 2013. "Overcoming Opportunism in Public-Private Project Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 25(1), pages 89-96, March.
    7. Jean Beuve & Marian W Moszoro & Pablo T Spiller, 2023. "Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 281-308.
    8. Abhay Aneja & Marian Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2015. "Political Bonds: Political Hazards and the Choice of Municipal Financial Instruments," NBER Working Papers 21188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.
    10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    11. Marian Moszoro & Gonzalo Araya & Fernanda Ruiz-Nuñez & Jordan Schwartz, 2015. "What Drives Private Participation in Infrastructure Developing Countries?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Stefano Caselli & Guido Corbetta & Veronica Vecchi (ed.), Public Private Partnerships for Infrastructure and Business Development, chapter 0, pages 19-44, Palgrave Macmillan.
    12. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Stéphane Saussier & Paola Valbonesi, 2018. "Introduction to the special issue: Public Procurement—new theoretical and empirical developments," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 1-4, March.
    14. Valentiny, Pál, 2018. "Coase-kép másképp: középpontban a közszolgáltatások [Coase otherwise: Public utilities]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 346-381.
    15. Ghosh, Ranjan & Kathuria, Vinish, 2016. "The effect of regulatory governance on efficiency of thermal power generation in India: A stochastic frontier analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 11-24.
    16. Mike, Károly, 2016. "Merre vezessen a magyar kapitalizmus útja?. Látkép Ronald Coase világítótornyából [Which course for Hungary s capitalism?. A view from Ronald Coase s lighthouse]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 597-614.
    17. Heikki Marjosola, 2021. "The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 388-407, April.
    18. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2019. "Political contestability and public contracting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 945-966, October.
    19. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2020. "An alternative to natural monopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 184-192, December.
    20. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15461_19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.