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La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance

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  • Jean‐Michel Glachant

Abstract

RESUME*: Contrairement à la théorie économique dominante qui s'intéresse aux réseaux sous l'angle de la problématique des monopoles naturels et de la tarification optimale, le présent article applique à l'analyse économique de la régulation, une autre voie théorique: celle de l'analyse des institutions. L'auteur montre que l'analyse économique institutionnelle de la régulation des marchés s'éloigne des politiques de «laisser faire les forces du marché» et met en exergue deux dimensions critiques dans la production de politiques efficaces de régulation et de dérégulation. Il s'agit, d'une part, du Market design qui porte sur la conception des nouveaux mécanismes de marchés, d'autre part, du Regulatory design qui porte sur la conception des nouveaux mécanismes de régulation. L'article passe ainsi en revue diverses structures de gouvernance (bilatérales, multilatérales ou trilatérales) adaptées à la spécificité des transactions impliquées par les activités en réseau. Il met également en évidence la nécessité de construire des institutions capables d'encadrer une ou des décennies de transition et qui tiennent compte des interventions des différents acteurs et en particulier des détenteurs d'un droit de veto.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:79:y:2008:i:3-4:p:487-525
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2008.00368.x
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