Regulation—the corridor to liberalization: the experience of the Israeli phone market 1984–2005
AbstractAn important part of the literature on regulatory economics is based on the US experience, where a well-established regulator faces a privately owned monopoly. It is sometimes forgotten that this model does not apply in many places where a newly established regulator faces a government owned, or a newly privatized, company. It definitely does not apply to the case of the Israeli communication industry where the government serves as regulator and at the same time is the owner of the wireline monopolist. The paper follows the regulatory experience of the Israeli communication industry over the last 20 years, analyzing its impact on consumers' welfare, the monopoly's profitability and its productivity. Though the Israeli institutions may look to a Western observer today as unique they were quite common in most of the developed economies prior to the wave of privatizations and deregulation in the 90s. The lessons learned from the Israeli experience have, however, more than a historic interest, and may be relevant for the regulatory process in general.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
The Israeli economy; Liberalization of public utilities industries; Regulation of the communication market; Asymmetric information; K23; L32; L43; L51; L96;
Other versions of this item:
- Reuben Gronau, 2006. "Regulation – the Corridor to Liberalization: The Experience of the Israeli Phone Market 1984-2005," NBER Working Papers 12617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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