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Optimal Transmission Capacity under Nodal Pricing and Incentive Regulation for Transco

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Author Info
Makoto TANAKA
Abstract

This paper examines regulatory incentive mechanisms for efficient investment in the transmission network, taking into account both technological externalities among transmission lines and information asymmetry between the regulator and the transmission company (Transco). First, by adding extra constraints associated with the power flow, we develop an extended price cap mechanism that can internalize technological externalities among transmission lines. We show that this new mechanism induces the Transco to choose the optimal transmission capacity under its budget constraint. An extended form of the Vogelsang and Finsinger (V-F) mechanism is also introduced. Next, we examine the surplus-based scheme with government transfers. We provide a formal analysis of the incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) scheme specifically for the Transco, demonstrating that it induces the Transco to choose the optimal transmission capacity without the budget constraint.

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Paper provided by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in its series Discussion papers with number 05021.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:05021

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  1. Ingo Vogelsang & Jorg Finsinger, 1979. "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 157-171, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bushnell, James B & Stoft, Steven E, 1996. "Electric Grid Investment under a Contract Network Regime," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 61-79, July.
  3. Chao, Hung-Po & Peck, Stephen, 1996. "A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 25-59, July.
  4. David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Roger E. Bohn & Michael C. Caramanis & Fred C. Schweppe, 1984. "Optimal Pricing in Electrical Networks over Space and Time," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 360-376, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2001. "Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 141-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hogan, William W, 1992. "Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 211-42, September.
  8. JOSKOW, Paul & TIROLE, Jean, 2004. "Merchant Transmission Investment," IDEI Working Papers 263, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  9. Juan Rosellón, 2003. "Different Approaches Towards Electricity Transmission Expansion," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 2(3), pages 238-269, September. [Downloadable!]
  10. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1988. "Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 297-306, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bushnell, James B. & Stoft, Steven E., 1997. "Improving private incentives for electric grid investment," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 85-108, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Wu, Felix, et al, 1996. "Folk Theorems on Transmission Access: Proofs and Counterexamples," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 5-23, July.
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