Designing regulatory contracts for the operators of power transmission networks has become a critical policy issue in the United States. In this paper, a regulatory contract is proposed that induces network operators to optimally expand the grid, which is crucial for the emergence of efficient wholesale power markets, while also satisfying the other traditional regulatory objectives. The proposed mechanism is readily implementable, since it builds on a contract currently in place in England and Wales.
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Article provided by International Association for Energy Economics in its journal The Energy Journal.
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Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2003.
"Merchant Transmission Investment,"
Working Papers
0304, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
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