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How to Auction an Essential Facility when Underhand Integration is Possible

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Author Info
Eduardo Engel ()
Ronald Fischer ()
Alexander Galetovic ()

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Abstract

There are many industries in which potentially competitive segments require services provided by natural monopoly bottlenecks (essential facilities). Since it is difficult to regulate these facilities, developing countries are using Demsetz auctions, where the facility is awarded to the firm that bids the lowest user fee. In this paper we show that when underhand agreements between the monopoly bottleneck and downstream firms are possible, Demsetz auctions need floors on bids, since otherwise welfare can be lower than with an unregulated monopoly.
We model an underhand agreement using a standard hidden information model. The essential facility is an uninformed principal randomly matched to a downstream company, which observes its costs after closing the underhand agreement. When the essential facility prefers the option of vertical separation, there is downstream competition, which implies that only low cost firms survive.
We find that a sufficiently high floor on bids promotes vertical separation, yielding higher welfare than either an unregulated or a vertically integrated monopoly. Moreover, prohibiting open vertical integration means this floor can be lower, thus enhancing welfare. The incentive compatibility constraints required by underhand agreements imply rent sharing and production distortions that make vertical integration less attractive.

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Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 79.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:79

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lee, Sang Hyup & Hamilton, Jonathan H, 1999. "Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 223-48, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," NBER Working Papers 6689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, December.
  5. Vickers, John, 1995. "Concepts of Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Daniel F. Spulber, 1989. "Regulation and Markets," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262192756, December.
  7. Richard A. Posner, 1972. "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(1), pages 98-129, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Awarding Monopoly Franchises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 375-87, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Besanko, David, 1985. "Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 33-37. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harstad, Ronald M & Crew, Michael A, 1999. "Franchise Bidding without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 141-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Economides, Nicholas, 1999. "Quality choice and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 903-914, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1358, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Integración Vertical en el Sector Eléctrico: Una guía para el usuario (Vertical integration in the electricity sector)," Documentos de Trabajo 158, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ronald Fischer & Rodrigo Gutiérrez & Pablo Serra, 2002. "The Effects of Privatization on Firms and on Social Welfare," Documentos de Trabajo 131, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rodrigo Gutierrez & Pablo Serra & Ronald Fischer, 2003. "The Effects of Privatization on Firms and on Social Welfare: The Chilean Case," RES Working Papers 3150, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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