Title Systems and Land Values
AbstractThe Torrens (or registration) and the recording title systems apply different principles to resolve conflicting claims to land title. This paper develops a theoretical model of how expected title risk and transactions costs affect land value across the two systems and ultimately concludes that the Torrens system leads to higher property values, ceteris paribus. It also suggests that empirical studies of the title system--land value nexus need to control for self-selection effects in the data. We use the simultaneous existence of two alternative title systems in Cook County, Illinois, as a natural experiment for comparing land values under each system. The estimates indicate that the Torrens system increases land value relative to the recording system when controlling for self-selection effects. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 45 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arrunada, Benito & Garoupa, Nuno, 2005.
"The Choice of Titling System in Land,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 709-27, October.
- Thomas Miceli & C. Sirmans, 2005.
"Time-Limited Property Rights and Investment Incentives,"
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,
Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 405-412, December.
- Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2003. "Time-Limited Property Rights and Investment Incentives," Working papers 2003-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Deininger, Klaus W. & Jin, Songqing, 2006.
"Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law,"
2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA
21465, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2009. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 22-38, May.
- Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2007. "Securing property rights in transition: lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4447, The World Bank.
- Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2006.
"The Value of Foreclosed Property,"
Journal of Real Estate Research,
American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(2), pages 193-214.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Henry J. Munneke & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2008.
"A Question of Title: Property Rights and Asset Values,"
2008-32, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Miceli, Thomas J. & Munneke, Henry J. & Sirmans, C.F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2011. "A question of title: Property rights and asset values," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 499-507.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.