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The Choice of Titling System in Land

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  • Arrunada, Benito
  • Garoupa, Nuno

Abstract

This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling system assuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance, and registration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of property rights to land under private titling and the two existing public titling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in the expected costs of forfeiture balances the higher cost of initial registration, a registration system is more efficient than a recording system. Implications for title assurance, land improvements, and transactions are also considered.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 48 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 709-27

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2005:v:48:i:2:p:709-27

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  1. Roland Kirstein, 2000. "Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 251-261, April.
  2. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
  3. Anderson, Terry L & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 427-54, October.
  4. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2000. "The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 370-389, May.
  5. Thomas Miceli & C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey Turnbull, 1998. "Title Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 305-323, November.
  6. Feder, Gershon & Feeny, David, 1991. "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 135-53, January.
  7. Miceli, Thomas J & Sirmans, C F, 1995. "The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 81-88, January.
  8. Alston, Lee J & Libecap, Gary D & Schneider, Robert, 1996. "The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 25-61, April.
  9. Miceli, Thomas J, et al, 2002. "Title Systems and Land Values," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 565-82, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Deininger, Klaus W. & Jin, Songqing, 2006. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21465, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  2. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 3-19.
  3. Benito Arruñada, 2007. "Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers," Economics Working Papers 1034, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. Arrunada, Benito, 2007. "Pitfalls to avoid when measuring institutions: Is Doing Business damaging business?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 729-747, December.
  5. Benito Arruñada, 2009. "Property titling and conveyancing," Economics Working Papers 1177, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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