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Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

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  • Benito Arruñada

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Abstract

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 93-116

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:23:y:2007:i:2:p:93-116

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

Related research

Keywords: Lawyers; Notaries; Property rights; Real estate; Transaction costs; K11; K12;

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References

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  1. Arrunada, Benito & Garicano, Luis & Vazquez, Luis, 2001. "Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 257-84, April.
  2. Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, 2001. "The choice of titling system in land," Economics Working Papers 607, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2004.
  3. Nyce, C. & Boyer, M.M., 1998. "An Analysis of the Title Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. 98-14, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  4. R. Hirschowitz, 1989. "The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 57(4), pages 266-272, December.
  5. Philip T. Hoffman & Gilles Postel-Vinay & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1998. "What do Notaries do?. Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(3), pages 499-, September.
  6. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  7. Hoffman, Philip T. & Postel-Vinay, Gilles & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 2001. "Priceless Markets," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226348018.
  8. Benito Arrunada, 2000. "The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers : An Efficiency Hypothesis of their Relation with Suppliers," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 277-296.
  9. Baker, Matthew, et al, 2002. "Optimal Title Search," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 139-58, January.
  10. Benito Arru�ada, 2002. "A Transaction Cost View of Title Insurance and its Role in Different Legal Systems," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 27(4), pages 582-601, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Electronic Titling: Potential and Risks," Working Papers 453, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Benito Arruñada, 2008. "How "Doing Business" jeopardizes institutional reform," Economics Working Papers 1088, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Arrunada, Benito, 2007. "Pitfalls to avoid when measuring institutions: Is Doing Business damaging business?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 729-747, December.

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