The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance
AbstractIn the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor). Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Henry J. Munneke & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2008.
"A Question of Title: Property Rights and Asset Values,"
2008-32, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Miceli, Thomas J. & Munneke, Henry J. & Sirmans, C.F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2011. "A question of title: Property rights and asset values," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 499-507.
- Arrunada, Benito & Garoupa, Nuno, 2005.
"The Choice of Titling System in Land,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 709-27, October.
- Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2000. "The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 370-389, May.
- Benito Arruñada, 2009. "Property titling and conveyancing," Economics Working Papers 1177, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, 2008.
"An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws,"
Real Estate Economics,
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 36(1), pages 31-45, 03.
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2006. "An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws," Working papers 2006-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Matthew J. Baker & Thomas Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2004. "An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws," Working papers 2004-26, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Miceli & C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey Turnbull, 1998. "Title Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 305-323, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.