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The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance

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Author Info
Miceli, Thomas J
Sirmans, C F

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Abstract

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor). Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 81-88
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:81-88

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945

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  1. Thomas Miceli & C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey Turnbull, 1998. "Title Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 305-323, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Matthew J. Baker & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, 2006. "An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws," Working papers 2006-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, 2001. "The Choice of Titling System in Land," Economics Working Papers 607, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.


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