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The choice of titling system in land

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This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling system assuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance and registration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of property rights on land under private titling and the two existing public titling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in the expected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initial registration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration system rather than a recording system. The development of private "title assurance" improves the standing of recording as compared to registration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency of the assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that is needed to align individual optimization, which disregards the transfer element in eviction, with social objectives.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 607.

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Date of creation: Mar 2001
Date of revision: Dec 2004
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:607

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: Land transfer; registration; property rights; title assurance; insurance;

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  1. Anderson, Terry L & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 427-54, October.
  2. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
  3. Kirstein, Roland, 1999. "Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 99-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  4. Thomas Miceli & C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey Turnbull, 1998. "Title Assurance and Incentives for Efficient Land Use," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 305-323, November.
  5. Lee J. Alston & Gary D. Libecap & Robert Schneider, 1996. "The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier," NBER Working Papers 5405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Feder, Gershon & Feeny, David, 1991. "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 135-53, January.
  7. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2000. "The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 370-389, May.
  8. Miceli, Thomas J, et al, 2002. "Title Systems and Land Values," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 565-82, October.
  9. Miceli, Thomas J & Sirmans, C F, 1995. "The Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 81-88, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7073, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2009. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 22-38, May.
  3. Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring Institutions: Is 'Doing Business' Damaging Business?," Working Papers 451, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Benito Arruñada, 2007. "Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 93-116, April.
  5. Benito Arruñada, 2009. "Property titling and conveyancing," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1177, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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