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Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

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Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1034.

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Date of creation: May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1034

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Keywords: Lawyers; notaries; property rights; real estate; transaction costs;

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  1. Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, 2001. "The choice of titling system in land," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 607, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2004.
  2. R. Hirschowitz, 1989. "The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 57(4), pages 266-272, December.
  3. Hoffman, Philip T. & Postel-Vinay, Gilles & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 2001. "Priceless Markets," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226348018.
  4. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
  5. Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1999. "Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 424, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Philip T. Hoffman & Gilles Postel-Vinay & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1994. "What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 719, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Benito Arruñada, 2000. "The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: An efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 445, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  8. Nyce, C. & Boyer, M.M., 1998. "An Analysis of the Title Insurance Industry," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. 98-14, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  9. Benito Arru�ada, 2002. "A Transaction Cost View of Title Insurance and its Role in Different Legal Systems," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 27(4), pages 582-601, October.
  10. Baker, Matthew, et al, 2002. "Optimal Title Search," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 139-58, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Benito Arruñada, 2008. "How "Doing Business" jeopardizes institutional reform," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1088, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Benito Arruñada, 2010. "Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring Institutions: Is 'Doing Business' Damaging Business?," Working Papers 451, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Benito Arruñada, 2009. "Electronic titling: Potential and risks," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1193, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2010.

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