Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers
AbstractDemand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1034.
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Lawyers; notaries; property rights; real estate; transaction costs;
Other versions of this item:
- Benito ArruÃ±ada, 2007. "Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 93-116, April.
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2007-05-26 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-05-26 (Regulation)
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