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What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751

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Author Info
Philip T. Hoffman (Caltech)
Gilles Postel-Vinay (INRA Paris)
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal (and UCLA)

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp719.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 719.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1994
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:719

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hoffman, Philip T. & Postel-Vinay, Gilles & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 1992. "Private Credit Markets in Paris, 1690?1840," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(02), pages 293-306, June. [Downloadable!]
  5. Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T, 1988. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 673-94, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bennardo, Alberto & Pagano, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2009. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Benito Arruñada, 2007. "Market and Institutional Determinants in the Regulation of Conveyancers," Economics Working Papers 1034, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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